

At the Crossroads in Jos: To Manzikert or Poitiers?¹

by

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What experience and history teach is this – that people and governments never have learned anything from history...² (Hegel)

Now these things happened to them as an example, and they were written for our instruction, upon whom the ends of the ages have come (1 Corinthians 10:11).

G. W. F. Hegel was one of Germany's greatest philosophers, and we should respect his wisdom; yet I still like to think with Paul that his rule has room for exceptions. If there is any time and place where an exception is sorely needed, it is surely in Jos in 2012. As Boko Haram target the city and as its people react, there is an urgent need to learn some lessons from history, just as the apostle Paul expected our forefathers in the Christian faith to do.

Standing at Terminus in the centre of Jos, people familiar with the city would know which way to take to go to Bauchi, Bukuru or Zaria – with or without signposts. But the metaphorical crossroads at which Christians in Jos now stand has signposts pointing to Manzikert and Poitiers, and most haven't a clue as to where these are, let alone what they will find if they reach them. That just shows our ignorance of history, for these are two of the greatest and most decisive battles in the long history of confrontation between Islam and countries that considered themselves Christian.

But it may be asked, 'What can be the relevance of events that took place on different continents a thousand or more years ago?' This paper aims to supply a very clear answer to that question. For without realising what they are doing, Christians in Jos have already set off on the road to Manzikert, which happens to be the road to disaster. Before it is too late they must retrace their steps and take the road to Poitiers, which is the way to triumph. We will look at each of these two battles in their contexts before applying the lessons to the present situation in Jos.

Manzikert (1071)³

It would not be too much to say that the battle of Manzikert created Turkey. In 1071 the Turks were only to be found on its eastern borders, having recently arrived from central Asia. What we now call Turkey was still part of the eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire, as it had been for longer than Turkey has now been Turkey. It was immediately after their decisive victory at Manzikert that the Turks flooded in and took over most of what thus became Turkey. What went wrong for the Byzantine champions of Christianity?

Early in that eleventh century things had definitely been looking up in the Byzantine Empire: it was stronger than it had been at any point in the four centuries since its southern half had been engulfed by the great initial thrust of Islam in the period immediately following Mohammed's death. The forty-nine year reign of Basil II, the longest in the empire's history,

was one of 'power and glory.'⁴ But after he died childless in 1025 things went downhill fast as different families and interest groups competed to get their hands on the wealth Basil had left behind – it was the age-old story of corruption and sectionalism that is just as familiar to us today. In the process the empire's military strength was dissipated – deliberately, so that it shouldn't pose a threat to the political factions. So when the Turkish presence on the eastern borders started to be perceived as a threat, the Byzantine Empire was ill-prepared to meet it.

By 1071 Romanus Diogenes had been on the throne for just three years, a seat he had occupied by marrying his predecessor's widow. Plenty of people were not happy to see him there and weren't too bothered by who should deal with him and how, so long as he could be removed. The malcontents included the church leader, Patriarch John Xiphilinus of Constantinople: Empress Eudoxia had obtained special permission from him to remarry (her dying husband had made her swear an oath not to) by hinting that his brother would be the lucky man. Politics of sectionalism, selfish ambition, greed, scheming and treachery are not a recent Nigerian invention, and they have always reaped the same disastrous harvest. Such was the countryside traversed in its early stages by the road to Manzikert.

By this time the Turks had converted to Islam and in 1055 captured the great Muslim city of Baghdad. Then under their charismatic leader Alp Arslan they started raiding into the rich lands of the Byzantine Empire. Emperor Romanus spent the whole of 1070 getting ready for a big military campaign the next year to deal with this threat decisively. Marching out in March 1071, his army looked big and powerful – it was around 80,000 strong. But it was not as strong as it looked: many of the men were mercenaries from elsewhere, only interested in money; few were battle-hardened; Romanus himself made both strategic and tactical errors as a general; and his soldiers were to show a fatal lack of discipline on the battlefield.

The first questionable thing about the campaign of 1071 was the fact that it happened at all. Alp Arslan did capture Manzikert and a neighbouring border town early that year, but then proceeded to his main agenda which was to raid south toward Egypt – so Sunni against Shia, Muslim fighting Muslim. It was only when the Byzantine Empire came out in massive force that he was obliged to change his plans, bringing it from their periphery to the centre. The fact that Romanus wasn't so much defending his land as going out to get the enemy was a significant part of the preparation for disaster. This is a point to which we will return in due course.

Having reached the borderland, Romanus divided his army in two, giving each the task of retaking one of the captured towns. This proved a serious error: the second army took no further part in events, vanishing from the scene, and Romanus ended up facing the full strength of Alp Arslan with just half of his army. First political, then military: in its different dimensions division reaped its dire harvest.

As Romanus retook Manzikert, Alp Arslan turned his forces round and swiftly appeared on the scene. In August 1071 the two armies prepared for battle on the plain south of the town. At this point we must consider their respective capabilities. The Byzantines were the more heavily armoured, and so better protected against the enemy's weapons, especially their arrows. But this also meant that they were slower and less manoeuvrable than the Turks, whose greatest strength was in their horse-mounted archers. A good general fights a battle in a way that will draw maximum benefit from his army's strengths, while a weak one will allow his enemy to dictate the tactics. Romanus showed his weakness by marching his army out to attack: for much of the day they kept advancing, but the Turks never allowed them to close for the kind

of hand to hand fighting in which the superior armour of the Byzantines would have been an advantage. The Turks kept falling back, but all the while they harried the Byzantines with their archery, especially on the flanks of the army. Rather late in the day, Romanus realised that he wasn't getting anywhere and ordered a retreat to the camp. It was at that strategic moment that Alp Arslan counter-attacked with force. The result was decisive victory against his enemies, recorded for us in the anguished words of one of the few hundred survivors:

It was like an earthquake: the shouting, the sweat, the swift rushes of fear, the clouds of dust, and not least hordes of Turks riding all around us. Depending on his speed, resolution and strength, each man sought safety in flight. The enemy followed in pursuit, killing some, capturing others and trampling yet others under their horses' hooves. It was a tragic sight, beyond any mourning or lamenting. What indeed could be more pitiable than to see the entire imperial army in flight, defeated and pursued by cruel and inhuman barbarians; the Emperor defenceless and surrounded by more of the same; ... the whole Roman state overturned – and knowing that the Empire itself was on the verge of collapse?⁵

But before we consider that outcome we need to take account of two further factors that contributed to the disaster. The first is straightforward. Instead of supporting the main body of Romanus' army, his reserve fled. Its commander later tried to excuse himself by saying he thought the order to retreat actually meant that the emperor had been killed, but in reality there was no ambiguity, and the man came from one of the leading families in the empire opposed to Romanus: just as division had set the scene for disaster, so it played its part in its final act. The second factor was the indiscipline of the Byzantine army. All through the day the Turks had been drawing the Byzantines into traps they were setting. They had attacked and then retreated, hoping that groups of Byzantines would leave the main body of the army and chase after them. And that is just what happened: in a fatal mixture of bravery and hot-headed indiscipline, groups of soldiers pursued the retreating Turks, only to be ambushed and cut to pieces far from any help. This happened throughout the day, and though each such loss was relatively small, the cumulative effect was to weaken the Byzantine army significantly, perhaps decisively. From Romanus at the top right down to the bottom, poor decisions were made that played right into the enemy's hands. This factor is of great importance, and we must return to it too in due course.

But what of Romanus and his empire? The morning after the battle a slave trader who had been acquiring stock from among the wounded lying on the field brought one of them to Alp Arslan, claiming he was the emperor. After a captive confirmed the identification, Alp made Romanus lie face down on the ground, stepped lightly on the back of his neck, and asked him what *he* would have done had their positions been reversed. Romanus said he would have flogged him to death. Instead of doing that, the Muslim Alp Arslan sent Romanus back home to reclaim his throne, his terms being the handing over of a few border towns plus a large annual tribute payment. Romanus' enemies at home rejected these terms, offering him a peaceful retirement instead. When he accepted, these 'Christians' treacherously gouged out his eyes and imprisoned him, where he died not long afterward. Meanwhile they were powerless to stop the victorious Turkish surge westward that created Turkey.

We now move over three thousand kilometres west and over three hundred years back in time to study another battle. Different nations were involved, yet it was still Muslims ranged against so-called Christian nations; the capabilities of the two armies resembled those on display at

Manzikert, but the tactics deployed on the battlefield were different; and the battle was equally decisive, though its outcome was the exact opposite.

Poitiers (732)

Precisely a century after Mohammed's death, the great tsunami of Islam-inspired Arab conquest that had followed came up against a wall in the centre of France that didn't just halt its progress: it reversed it. A slow retreat started that after many centuries pushed Islam out of Western Europe. A chronicler writing within a generation of the events called it a 'wall of ice,' and I hope we will understand its significance and relevance before we finish.

After completing the capture of Egypt from the Byzantines in 642, the Arabs flooded west across North Africa, reaching the Atlantic Ocean in Morocco before the end of the seventh century. In 711 they crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and entered Europe. The king of Spain rushed the entire length of the country to fight them, only for his army to be annihilated (maybe they were too exhausted from their journey to fight well). Within five years almost the entire country had fallen into Arab hands. Not content with that, they soon poured over the mountains into the south of France, capturing the first kingdom they met there. Their recurring problem was to agree on how to share out the loot they won; but a solution was to hand: go further to get still more loot. Thus it was that Abd al-Rahman al-Ghafiqi, the recently appointed Emir over Muslim lands in Western Europe, set off to the north in 732 with a powerful army. His eventual goal was to loot the richest French shrine of all, that of St Martin at Tours, but he spent a profitable summer winning battles and destroying towns along the way.

Tours was situated in the heart of the Frankish lands that had been ruled since 715 by Charles Martel, a successful warrior who had built up his power at the expense of his neighbours. These neighbours included the major victim of the early part of Abd Al-Rahman's campaign in the person of Eudo, Duke of Aquitaine, yet when Eudo fled north in desperation to appeal to Charles for help, Charles listened to him and added what remained of Eudo's army to his own as he headed south to meet the Arabs. This was not the dynamic we saw in the Byzantine Empire, where Romanus' enemies were happy to see his power destroyed by Muslims; and this ability to sink lesser differences in order to face a common enemy was a notable foundation for the success that followed.

Charles put his army between Abd Al-Rahman and his prize, blocking the road between Poitiers and Tours; his front line may have been a few hundred metres wide, set between a river and a hill. Unlike Romanus, he was not on the edge of his kingdom, determined to chase and catch an enemy who had actually planned to fight someone entirely different; he was right in its heartland, defending it against aggression. This is significant for various reasons, but most important among them was that it helped Charles employ battlefield tactics that favoured his army's strengths. For like the Byzantines at Manzikert, Charles Martel's forces were well-armoured but slow, and thus stronger in defence than attack. And the Arabs at Poitiers had a similar profile to their Turkish successors, mounted on horses, fast and manoeuvrable, relying much on their archery.

After several days during which Abd Al-Rahman may have been seeing whether he could reach his goal without a pitched battle, the Arabs attacked on 25 October, which was the first day of Ramadan in 732. They didn't have the power to overwhelm the Franks, who stood shoulder to shoulder behind the big shields they had planted in the ground. So they tried their habitual tactics: first attack, then fall back, tempting their enemy to go after them to seal an imagined

triumph; after that turn, surround and overwhelm the detached parties of the enemy with the greater numbers their speed enabled them to concentrate at a point. This tactic had won them many victories and it would bring Muslim armies more triumphs in the future, not least at Manzikert. It only failed at Poitiers because the Franks failed to play the role into which they had been cast. How could they not? In the battle friends were dying at each other's side, adrenalin flowing, emotions churning; if your enemy is getting at you, you want to get at him – it seems like a time for impulsive action, not cool thinking. Yet this leader told his men to stand where they were and do nothing but defend, and that is precisely what they did! The difference between triumph and disaster, between Poitiers and Manzikert, was *discipline*: there they stayed, a 'wall of ice' that nothing the Arabs threw at it could break. It was that discipline that enabled the Franks to fight the battle on their own terms, to their own advantage, not allowing their enemy to manipulate them into acting according to his plan.

As the day went on and their tactics failed to achieve success, the Arab attacks became increasingly desperate, just as late in the day at Manzikert the baffled Romanus had in desperation ordered his troops to turn round. In one of the last attacks Abd Al-Rahman himself was killed, and that delivered the final blow to his army's disintegrating morale. Charles kept his army in its defensive line till night fell; and in the morning he formed them up again, just like the previous day. No noise of drums, horns and cymbals: all was quiet, no-one came. Acting with great caution in case a trap had been set, he sent out scouts who eventually reported that the Arabs had fled in the night, leaving much of their booty behind in their deserted camp. Eudo recovered Aquitaine, Charles and then his son Pepin reconquered other parts of southern France, and his grandson Charlemagne took the reconquest into north-east Spain. Arab power in Europe never recovered.

Jos (2012)

There are not tens of thousands lined up on either side for a set-piece battle in Jos in 2012, so it is fair to question the relevance of these pages from distant history for the current situation. That question will soon be answered, but before seeking out and applying any lessons we should note the parallels between the present situation and those we have observed in history, for it is because of these that the history is instructive for us. Jos too is at the interface of Islam and Christianity; as in the historical situations just examined it is a 'hot' and fluid one, not 'cool' and stable; and in all three situations Islam threatens a place whose inhabitants consider themselves Christian. It is also the case in Jos in 2012 that each side has its strengths and weaknesses, which are not unrelated to those we have observed in history, and the victory is likely to go to the side that is able by playing to its own strengths to draw its enemy onto ground that will prove less favourable to it. And some principles noted in our historical study are universal: good leaders and disciplined forces always hold the advantage. What is more, neither of these appears on its own nor even by organising a fervent prayer meeting: there is no substitute for the development of appropriate skills in producing both leaders and people who will prove worth their while to lead.

Rather as in days of old a new Turkish wave came in when the Arab wave had receded, so in Jos in 2012 Boko Haram terrorism has burst upon the scene just as people were starting to hope that the destructive communal violence of the previous decade might be coming to an end. Some may not think the difference of any significance – after all it is all Islam, and many of us have bought the propaganda that maintains that Islam is one. (If we take the trouble to look around us though, we will see that, for people who are supposedly one, they are fighting each other an awful lot in so many countries.) This change from communal violence to the

terrorism of Boko Haram is actually of great significance, because trying to go on fighting the previous battle when the enemy has changed his capability or tactics is one of the most frequent and fatal errors littering military history.

Boko Haram shares a characteristic common to terrorists, a desire to communicate widely its perceptions, aims and even to a degree its plans. In this it is different from the politically inspired communal violence of the previous phase: since the latter always hid behind claims that its attacks were just spontaneous reactions to trigger situations, its leadership, affiliation and aims stayed in the shadows and always had to be pieced together uncertainly from scraps of evidence. Boko Haram makes no secret of the fact that its aim is to Islamise the entire country of Nigeria. In so doing it attacks government targets as much as Christian ones, and is even ready to target Muslims who oppose its agenda.

Within this broad aim, in both word and deed Boko Haram has made it clear that Jos does *not* have any special significance. This is a change from the situation in the first decade of this century, when it was evident that Jos was the focal point of politically inspired ethno-religious violence. That focus was the result of political calculation of a kind of which Boko Haram has not yet shown itself capable. It can hardly lay claim to sophistication so long as it pursues an aim it doesn't stand even the remotest prospect of achieving, the Islamisation of Nigeria.

Boko Haram have even explained why Jos featured in their plans: it is because of what Christians had done to Muslims there, with special emphasis on the violence that marked the start of Ramadan in 2011. Their Christmas attack on the Mountain of Fire and Miracles Church headquarters in Jos failed, so they targeted COCIN Headquarters Compound Church with their first suicide bomb in the city. This caused far less damage and loss of life than they had hoped, but it did at least go off, and it got lots of publicity and thus made a point. That might well have been the end of the matter in Jos, at least for a while, but for the retaliatory violence in which the number of Muslims killed was considerably greater than that of the bomb victims. It was probably because of this that they set off their second suicide bomb at St Finbar's Catholic Church, Rayfield two weeks later. But further retaliation after this left the balance sheet still unfavourable to the Muslims, so what should be expected next?

Retaliatory killing is usually done in extreme anger and hatred, which drive rational thought from the mind and make people lash out viciously and heartlessly at anyone who can be connected in any way with the primary object of this wrath. Only afterward can the perpetrators attempt to switch their minds back on and argue that the reprisals will teach their enemies such a lesson that they will desist from further attacks. This registers so low on the scale of human thinking that I am not even sure that it deserves to be called by that name. If you ask these same people how many deaths among their own brothers it will take for them to give up their resolve to keep on killing, they will tell you that the more their brothers, sisters and children die, the more they will be determined to kill in return. Yet they 'think' that fanatical Muslims – of all people! – will have less appetite for killing and being killed than they!

If any indigenous youth do get far enough in their thinking to realise that their enemies will be at least as determined as they are, and yet suppose that they can still win, it is only because of fatal errors in their calculations. For it is not about relative strength within the Jos area: Boko Haram and Islam more generally have the whole of the far north of Nigeria to draw on and will do so if they think the need arises. In an age of sophisticated weaponry, quick travel and instantaneous communication the situation is very different to that pertaining in the jihad two

centuries ago, when fragmented Islamic forces could be countered by relatively small coalitions of tribes.

People from outside Islam, especially those who have even the faintest degree of Christian influence in their upbringing, should not imagine that they can out-hate Muslims and outdo them in violence. Even the vaguest understanding of the history of Islam, from its beginnings to the pages being written in contemporary news reports, should put paid to that notion. The victims of the retaliatory violence are ordinary members of the local Muslim community, not people with any particular connection with Boko Haram, which means that their families and wider networks will engage in counter-retaliation as fresh recruits or reinvigorated veterans of the earlier communal violence. They will see this as defensive violence, which is not liable to the same fatigue as ended up weakening the aggression that marked the decade of communal violence. In the process their perception of Boko Haram will change: they will no longer be seen as disturbers of the peace but as brothers with whom they should stand as one against the common foe. The 'Christian' youth of the Plateau are doing a better job as recruiting agents for Boko Haram than Boko Haram could ever do for themselves.

As Boko Haram wake up to this fact they are likely to re-strategise in a way that will put Jos at the centre of their plans for the first time. Generally speaking, Christians elsewhere have so far not reacted to their violence with counter-violence, so no fuel was added to the fire. But now the foolish 'Christians' in Jos are cooperating with them, so there is the potential to build levels of violence that they could only dream of achieving without this help. We should therefore expect further and more substantial interventions from them in Jos before too long: they will want to add more fuel of their own to this promising fire. Because the first two attacks did not come up to expectation from their perspective, the third is likely to be mounted on a bigger scale – they have shown their capacity for this, most recently in Kano. It is also likely that it will involve a change of pattern: terrorism specialises in delivering the unexpected.

Because the dynamics of retaliation mean that the revenge taken is greater than the initial harm suffered, by mathematical necessity violence will keep on spiralling up to ever higher levels. If nothing intervenes to stop this process, the end result could be a civil war with a huge death toll accompanied by all kinds of destruction and suffering. Geography suggests that the Middle Belt would suffer most, with the flashpoint in Jos likely to undergo the most thorough destruction. The only people who might conceivably rejoice in such a situation would be Boko Haram. This is the scenario toward which Jos is being led by the undisciplined indigenous youth and the even less excusable older people who are egging them on.

This is surely the point at which we should start to use our minds and learn the lessons of history. The Byzantine and Frankish armies that went out to battle at Manzikert and Poitiers respectively were in some ways similar – in particular both were well-armed and defensively strong. The difference between triumph and disaster wasn't huge, but it is of huge importance. One contributing factor to the disaster at Manzikert was the failure of the Byzantines to unite against their common foe. If, like the Byzantine empire nearly a thousand years ago, there are Plateau State politicians who think that they can make use of the Muslim threat to deal with their rivals, then they should realise before it is too late that what they would be left with afterward would not be worth their while to rule. At Poitiers in contrast, Charles Martel and Eudo of Aquitaine sank their differences and fought together. That lesson should be obvious enough.

But there was a more critical difference between the armies of the ‘Christian’ nations at Manzikert and Poitiers. The Muslim tactics at the two battles were similar, to get their opponents to come out of their strong lines and chase them, at which point they could concentrate their strength against smaller numbers and overwhelm them. In one case it worked and they won a comprehensive victory; in the other it did not and they were defeated just as decisively. In the end this boiled down to the difference between an army that kept its defensive discipline and one which lost it. But that difference was created in part at least both by the strategies adopted on the two campaigns and the tactics adopted on the two battlefields. Emperor Romanus took the war to the Turks, setting out to attack them even at a time when the Turks had other faraway targets in mind. One can liken this to the retaliatory violence on the part of indigenes in Jos that is drawing Boko Haram to concentrate their power on Jos when they had other things in mind. In contrast Charles Martel’s strategy was purely defensive, to halt a powerful Arab raid deep into his territory, one that could have been the precursor to conquest. Tactically too, Charles insisted his army stay in its defensive lines, so forcing the Arabs to attack, while Romanus in contrast led his army out to attack. Having a purely defensive mindset must have made it easier for the Frankish army to resist the temptation to go out and chase the retreating enemy; this would have been much harder for the Byzantines: they were in any case advancing against the enemy, so it was all too easy to turn their advance into a chase, with fatal consequences. Victory was won through adopting a consistently defensive posture: from campaign strategy to battlefield tactics to refusal to allow the enemy to provoke them into countering.

So far Christian communities elsewhere in Nigeria that have been subject to Boko Haram attack have by and large shown the same kind of discipline as the Franks who won the day at Poitiers. But in Jos such defensive discipline has not been maintained, which shows that Christian indigenes have started out on the road to Manzikert and disaster. The lesson to draw from these two otherwise similar battles with such different outcomes is that it is essential to adopt a thoroughly defensive posture and be disciplined enough to refuse to allow any provocation to force its abandonment. Communities should by all means do what they can to supplement the security measures set in place by state security forces, including any measures likely to foil known Boko Haram tactics. But above all, communities targeted by Boko Haram need to understand that they must on no account take action against any Muslim not directly involved in an attack, and see that maintaining discipline on this is the key to emerging from the situation victorious rather than defeated. Jos needs its own ‘wall of ice,’ just like the Franks at Poitiers. For that is how its people will be able to fight on ground they choose, playing to their strengths, rather than foolishly letting Boko Haram dictate to them.

But how is that discipline to be instilled? Those involved in reprisal killings appear to be self-appointed guardians of the communities to which they are actually a threat, without even rudimentary command structures and thus even a foundation upon which to build discipline. If intervention is left till moments of crisis it will have no impact: the heads of the youth will then be too hot to hear any kind of reason. Community leaders need to take the youth in hand immediately as a matter of great urgency: doing so may well be the only thing that can put a halt to the cycle of attack and counter-attack that will end up bringing everything down in mutual destruction.

I talk of community and not church leaders for a reason. The fact that pastors are to be found among those advocating the road to Manzikert and disaster is perhaps the most appalling feature of the ghastly scenario currently faced. I don’t think the Church has ever in its history sunk as low as it has on the Plateau today, for not even in the worst medieval militarising of

Christianity did the priests double as military commanders. One should not expect much of young people who in many cases do not know the Lord Jesus Christ, but what can be said of pastors who reject the teaching of Jesus and advocate and even practise speaking the language of Satan, that of hatred and murder, rather than God's language of love? Pastors who in effect think that Satan can take over to help when things reach a stage at which God is no longer able to cope?

The reason why this critical situation could still be the start of something wonderful for the kingdom of God is that it is lifting the cover off the false Christianity that has been quietly accumulating for decades, making its betrayal of the faith clear. With that, it may still be possible to reclaim people – pastors and church leaders included – who will wake up to the fact that they have wandered from the faith, and also to get others who had no idea and therefore no interest to see what Christianity truly is and give their lives to Christ. Satan uses both undercover and open methods in his warfare against Christ; both can be very effective, but they can be tricky to combine.

The argument of this paper should not be misinterpreted as advocacy of 'folding arms' or fleeing from ancestral lands. If the indigenes of Jos can learn from Charles Martel to simply stand and defend, not falling into their enemies' trap by chasing after them with retaliatory violence, the resultant 'wall of ice' will be unbreakable. The difference between evil aggressors and righteous defenders will be clearly seen, and a victory greater than Charles' will be won: greater, because it will have a spiritual dimension in which people who see that difference will move across from the kingdom of darkness to the kingdom of light. If even in the present murky situation God is drawing Muslims to new life in Christ, what will happen when the light of the Church starts to shine brightly?

¹ This is a lightly revised version of a special lecture delivered at the Theological College of Northern Nigeria (TCNN) on 2 April 2012.

² G W F Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, Introduction, quoted in *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, New Edition (Oxford: OUP, 1979 r. 1980), p. 244.

³ The historical source I rely on throughout is Stephen O'Shea, *Sea of Faith: Islam and Christianity in the Medieval Mediterranean World* (London: Profile Books, 2006), which has a chapter each on Poitiers (pp. 48-77) and Manzikert (pp. 102-29).

⁴ O'Shea, p. 109.

⁵ Attalates, quoted in John Julius Norwich, *Byzantium: The Apogee* (New York: Penguin, 1993), 352-53, quoted in O'Shea, p. 124.